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STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

BY

COLONEL THOMAS H. TUTT United States Army

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

American Diplomacy and Military Strategy

by

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ABSTRACT

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The model formerly used to create national military strategy has been rendered obsolete by changes that have profoundly affected the entire foreign policy community. Gone are the days when a president aided by a few Cabinet members and their staffs could quietly construct a national strategy from which a military strategy would be derived. The simple, direct relationship between diplomacy, military strategy and economic policy that previously defined a coordinated national strategy no longer exists. What is left is a much more complex and poorly defined system of relationships with an ever-growing number of players.

As such, the traditional relationship between warriors and diplomats needs to change. What was marginally sufficient in the old model may be dangerously inadequate to meet our future national challenges. Despite the valiant efforts of a concerned minority, there is ample evidence that the rank and file military and Foreign Service Officers are growing further apart and are less aware of their need for one another. Current laws and policies actually penalize the pay and promotions of many non-military government employees who would otherwise be willing to work closely with other agencies. In fact, much needs to be done today to build bridges over the institutional and cultural gaps between these communities so that they can effectively interact with the numerous players in foreign policy. Of great significance are the roles, agendas and influence of Congress, the Press, NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), single-issue advocacy groups and other legislated federal agencies.

The recommendations in this research project focus on what the Departments of Defense and State can do to meet the coming challenges. The easiest of these challenges are organizational and cultural; the more difficult task will be the required intellectual shift. Bureaucratic foot-dragging, awaiting a national leadership epiphany, is time poorly spent. The fundamental changes to our foreign policy system are probably inalterable and will not be greatly affected by a change in administrations. Thus, it will be to those with a vested interest to the success of our foreign policy that change must be targeted. A hierarchy of education and training in foreign policy can and must be created to develop foreign policy professionals who understand how to think strategically, beyond the parochial limits of their organizations. The closing of the gaps in the military-diplomatic community will lead to warriors who know when to think more like diplomats and diplomats who will likewise understand when to think more like warriors.

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My introduction to the both the importance and the complexities of this research was through the thoughtful responses of more than 80 Army Foreign Area Officers and 20 Foreign Service Officers who were willing to share their experiences, insights and advice. Colonel (Retired) Bill Clontz, an Army FAO with keen insights and great common sense, came to my rescue as I wrestled with the issue of how a military professional should view both their responsibilities and their limits in diplomacy. Other great insights were made by Colonels Steve Gotowicki, Rick Shaw, Tom Gewecke and Joe Haning,

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All of these inputs were valuable, but the most influential critic of my work was Casimir Yost, the Director of the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. His intellect, knowledge and experience with both the academic and practical side of foreign policy led to vast improvements in my understanding of the complex nature of today's foreign policy community and the dilemmas they face.

Lastly, I wish to recognize the anonymous authors of "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus." Their great insights into the differences between military and Foreign Service Officers were developed a few years ago when the professional traditions of the day were to avoid discussion of such ungentlemanly things. I can only hope that the foreign policy and national strategy community is now ready to benefit from their advice.

My sincere thanks to all. If the final document is still far from a complete picture of the complexities of our foreign policy system and what we must do to meet the coming challenges, I can only say that I have learned greatly along the way, but must leave the resolution of the problem to those officers who will come after me.

Thomas H. Tutt Colonel, US Army

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AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

There is no more critical issue in foreign policy than the relationship of force and diplomacy. An imbalance between these essential elements can thwart all other hopes and aspirations. The catastrophe of an imprudent war can be either the result of a deliberate, hostile policy on the part of an opponent, or most unfortunately, the result of one's own blundering. For a nation as powerful as the United States, it is the second condition that deserves the closest examination.

Any examination of military strategy would need to consider the validity of its source. Thus, this paper's first question must be: Is a specific national security strategy still relevant? Current policy trends appear to replace the concrete strategies of the past with a flexible and ambiguous approach to the future. Some argue that we may no longer be capable of defining our national interest beyond the generalities of physical and economic self-protection. If so, perhaps national strategy has already been replaced by an "operational style" to which the military must adjust its military strategy.

This paper was influenced by a startling conundrum: that the American military risks becoming the preferred option of US peacetime foreign policy in a way they never intended, nor were designed to be. If this use of military capabilities is in conflict with their strategic purpose, it could have dire consequences for the peace and stability of the world. Most likely, this shift will be an enthusiastic, natural and insidious process; completely legal and Congressionally endorsed. It is being driven by the White House's substitution of an operational style for strategy.

In an operational style environment, doctrine and theory have a difficult time keeping pace.

Outdated explanations of relationships serve only to camouflage the real nature and complexity of the decision making process. An operational style based system becomes very dynamic, with multiple players engaging in a continuous dialectic. The number and weighting of variables change according to the topic, degree of political power and level of interest of each player.

The second question deals with the role of the military in foreign policy. What is the ideal relationship between the military, the State Department, the Administration and Congress in the formulation and execution of foreign policy? All agree the issue is important. To military minds, success in this relationship can mean the difference between victory and defeat. To civilian minds, this relationship more usually means the difference between peace and war. As should be expected, opinions on this relationship are both varied and strongly held.

The true impact of the substitution of an operational style for a structured strategy mechanism must be assessed over a longer period of time than a single administration, but is likely to have severe negative results for the nation. We may have lost our nation's ability to predict and shape world events. If true, what can we do to get our defense and foreign policy back into balance? If there is any merit to the hypothesis that military strategy and foreign policy are on diverging tracks, then the American military, along with Congress and the president, has a direct and special responsibility to address the causes of this rupture. Further, all the key foreign policy players have a vested interest in an efficiently operating

State Department that can adequately plan, coordinate (along with the NSC) and execute foreign policy as it was originally intended.

These differences of context between an operational style and a traditional foreign policy framework have a tremendous impact on how the military is viewed and what role it is allowed to play in strategy, policy and diplomacy. Some question the fundamental purpose of a large military in today's world. As one State Department backed writer put it, "we have no unique national interest other than our existence as a nation – an interest that is not in jeopardy." Many believe that a large investment in the military is indefensible while American diplomacy remains so poorly resourced. In *America's Place in the World*, Foreign Service Officer and author Daniel R. Russell wrote, "By way of context our defense budget is greater than those of the next ten largest military powers combined (few of whom are potential rivals anyway)." Few American diplomats understand or publicly support the Defense budget. In fact, American diplomats today are more likely to express their required foreign policy program funding as "never more than the cost of a respectable weapons system at the Pentagon."

At the extreme, some American diplomats view the Defense budget as frivolous. A classic issue is the question of why our military cost so much more than others. The level of these debates seldom considers that a North Korean soldier is considerably less well-fed, clothed, equipped or paid than his American counterpart. The idea that the American soldier is someone totally different than our enemies, who has a family with a television, computer and car while the North Korean does not is not weighed. The fact that the American soldier with tons of US-made supplies had to be moved thousands of miles by ship or plane is never mentioned. The tendency is to assume that all armies are alike and to take absolute personnel numbers and compare them blindly. Tellingly, similar comparisons are seldom if ever made with other branches of the government, nor with other high-cost programs. Does this indicate an underlying hostility that is also reflective of a more important and growing gap between warnors and diplomats that affects diplomacy and military strategy?

Some diplomats find themselves more willing to use military force than do their Pentagon counterparts. In the policy debates over Bosnia, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke saw himself as a "maximalist" in the use of force and saw those at the Pentagon as "minimalists." His view of the military's resistance to change their role to fit a post-Cold War world was decidedly negative. As he explained in his book, *To End a War*,

The military did not like civilian interference "inside" their own affairs. They preferred to be given a limited and clearly defined mission from their civilian colleagues and then decide on their own how to carry it out. In recent years, the military had adopted a politically potent term for assignments they felt were too broad: "mission creep." This was a powerful pejorative, conjuring up images of quagmires. But it was never clearly defined, only invoked, and always in the negative sense, used only to kill someone else's proposal.⁴

Other public comparisons made between the Foreign Service and the military border on contempt. One FSO wrote, "We spent roughly the same amount on foreign affairs as on military family housing and

on recreational resources in national parks." State Department personnel commonly portray the shortages they face in comparison with what they perceive as the unjustifiable relative wealth of the Department of Defense. There would seem to be a vast chasm between the FSO and the military officer. Surprisingly to some, they share more fundamental similarities than differences. When these two groups independently engage in commentary or debate on foreign policy's direction, the need for additional resources, their disdain for Congressional interference and the problems of junior officer retention, remote hardship assignments, pay and morale, they appear nearly indistinguishable in their concerns and motivations for service. Yet they are by and large, ignorant of their common situation, if not of their common cause.

There would also seem to be a sharp division between State and Defense as organizations. This paper will argue that this gap does exist, but was a luxury of the past. That chasm must now be bridged. The military-diplomatic relationship that was marginally sufficient during the Cold War may now be dangerously inadequate to meet our future national challenges. More than ever before, close cooperation, mutual respect and understanding between America's warriors and diplomats will be essential criteria for our nation's success.

THE FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM

The Post-Cold War American government lacks a foreign policy strategy. It has instead substituted a reactive operational style that results in the administration rapidly shifting policy positions. This operational style is characterized by its fluidity and by its strong internal priority to protect the administration from partisan political attack. Although this serves the White House well in reacting to world events or to domestic criticism, it creates a leadership vacuum in foreign policy and distorts the traditional model used to formulate national strategy.

As early as 1993 analysts were warning of the potentially dangerous effects of ignoring strategy and foreign policy. In an article in the Atlantic Monthly, Jonathan Clarke gave this unheeded advice,

To get away from reactive, seat-of-the-pants management of foreign affairs, Clinton badly needs to construct a new concept of America's place in the world which will allow him to protect the interests and project the values of the United States... Otherwise a relentless combination of global events, CNN film crews, and syndicated columnists will imprison him and leave him and his presidency foundering.⁶

Worse yet, this now appears not to be a temporary condition that will change simply by a new administration coming to office. The above quote would seem to suggest that this foreign policy free-for-all only applies to President Clinton, but that is not the case. The ground rules for foreign policy formulation have inalterably changed. The mechanism that developed peacetime national security strategy will likely never be able to reclaim its uncontested authority. The simple days of the past, when the president aided by a few trusted cabinet members and their staffs could quietly construct a foreign policy, are gone forever.

Over the last three decades the Executive Branch has surrendered much of its foreign policy authority to Congress and by extension, to the legislated federal agencies. The Press, watchdog organizations and single-issue groups also exert profound influence. These can effectively enable or block policies that only a decade ago were still considered presidential prerogatives. Thus, there are a number of key players for which the traditional foreign policy formulation model did not account.

Under the traditional model, coordinated diplomatic efforts, military strategy and economic policy were directly driven by a national security strategy. The implementation of this strategy was referred to as our foreign policy. Several aspects of the current foreign policy environment have delinked, if not destroyed this model. First, economic policy, a core concern of the present Administration, has been allowed to follow market pressures. In 1994 this was furthered as the White House created the National Economic Council, separate and distinct from the National Security Council.

However, it was never made clear as to which federal agency had the lead for national economic policy. The not too surprising result is that Treasury, Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative continue to battle for supremacy while the State Department takes a back seat. Both ambassadors and generals now find themselves undercut by other federal agents who have a separate agenda in foreign policy. Second, any lack of leadership on the part of the president, especially if he fails to establish a clear set of criteria for choosing between priorities, can and does lead to a bureaucratic free-for-all among the Washington agencies.

Historical Background

Intuitively we know the military's relationship with the State Department has changed over time. Before the Second World War, both theorists and practitioners saw diplomacy and military force as the oil and water of US foreign policy. Considered mutually exclusive, one was to be used when the other had failed. When mixed together by necessity, they soon separated into their natural elements. Historically, diplomacy and force were viewed as opposites, with a clear dividing line. Such was evident in 1941 as Secretary of State Cordell Hull conceded failure in his talks with Japanese Ambassador Kichisaburo Normura with his statement to Secretary of War Henry Stimpson on the eve of Pearl Harbor, "I have washed my hands of it, and it is now in the hands of you and Knox – the Army and Navy."

Once the war had begun the military assumed that their Commander in Chief's political goals became principally their domain. Certainly, the exigencies of the war effort made the linkage between the military and the President more direct and limited the number of players in foreign policy. As expected, most wartime diplomacy was strongly linked to military strategy. Those who believed force and diplomacy to be opposites assumed the use of force would completely predominate. As such, some diplomats working in military theaters of operation found their motives and purpose strongly questioned. One example of this was American diplomat Robert Murphy, later to be our first post-war ambassador to Japan, while he was in North Africa during World War II. He was once pointedly asked by a two-star general, "Will you please tell me what in hell the State Department is doing in an active theater of war?"

The heyday of military diplomacy extended several years after the war's end. Military men influenced and in some cases even modeled the immediate postwar revisions in the State Department. State Department files and correspondence were changed to copy the US Army model. General George C. Marshall, upon becoming Secretary of State, introduced a Policy Planning Staff to provide long-range planning similar to what his military staffs had done. His deputy and later Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, had been an Army colonel and continued the influence of military traditions and thought at State.⁹

The same National Security Act which created the Department of Defense in 1947 also created the President's National Security Council, patterned on the Joint Board of World War II and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee that dealt with the political and military issues of enemy national surrender and occupation. ¹⁰ Subsequently, many of the war's successful battlefield commanders were named as ambassadors, Allied High Commissioners, Occupational Commanders and ministers around the world. This group included Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Lucius Clay in Berlin, Douglas MacArthur in Japan, Mark Clark in Vienna, Walter Bedell Smith in Moscow, Admiral Alan Kirk in Brussels, then Moscow, and a few years later, Generals Matthew Ridgway at NATO's top military post and Jim Gavin as ambassador in Paris. ¹¹

The Changing Relationship

Despite strong proclamations of another American Secretary of State some forty years later that "strength and diplomacy go together, it is never one or the other," the two communities have seldom been more separate and dissimilar. They differ in their approach to missions, in organizational structure and in their underlying corporate cultures. In many ways they continue to compete and continue to view themselves as the oil and water of foreign policy.

For some theoreticians, State and Defense remain the twin Executive Branch pillars of foreign policy. However, the reality is that their relationship and roles have dramatically changed during the past four decades while the foreign policy process has grown to include more involvement by Congress, the White House and numerous other agencies of government. The role of key players has varied with each Administration. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson personally selected bombing targets during the war in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger ran foreign policy for the White House in the 1970s. Whether he was National Security Advisor or Secretary of State made no difference. With the diminution of presidential political prestige from the legacies of Vietnam, Watergate and Irangate, Congress developed a more activist role in foreign policy during the 1980s that continues today.

Perhaps the differences between State and Defense were less noticeable during the Cold War.

Now they stand in stark contrast to one another, especially after the 1990s¹³ when greater inter-agency integration had been universally acknowledged. Some of these differences are quite intentional and serve a useful purpose. Others are contentious creations of today's unique Washington policy environment.

Some ask how much efficiency in the foreign policy process is to be expected, or even if such efficiency is desirable. The American governmental framework is based on competing differences, on the natural tension of "checks and balances." In his work, *America's Place in the World*, Foreign Service Officer Daniel R. Russell recently wrote, "Discord between the executive and legislative branches undermines the solidarity and predictability of American foreign policy." Not all would agree. Though many in the Executive Branch might wish our foreign policy "be left to the professionals", the trend since the end of the war in Vietnam has been in the opposite direction and has only picked up steam in the aftermath of the Cold War. In fact, the same author goes on later to say, "The theory of a wise elite operating without the interference of politics is a myth. Public accountability and the vigorous political challenges that compel an administration to explain and justify its policies are essential safeguards."

There is no doubt that the American foreign policy system is changing more rapidly than it can be institutionalized. Frustrations set in when the doctrinal and orderly intellectual constructs fail to apply to the new situations. As Daniel R. Russell set the conditions for his examination of it:

I looked at the very credible theory that a combination of factors flowing from the increasingly complex environment was negatively affecting foreign policy. First among these was the ignorance of the U.S. public about the world. Second, the rise of single issue pressure groups as well as the emergent influential role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Third, the frequently partisan and interventionist character of Congress (quick to resort to legislation on lesser issues). And fourth, a complex and convoluted executive branch bedecked with ever-more specialized agencies and task forces. ¹⁴

American foreign policy in the 1990s has been frequently portrayed as reactive in nature. Certainly, most Administrations have an "operational style" when confronted on any publicly-driven policy issue. This is a delicate balance between the need to inform the public, to avoid partisan criticism and yet to reserve some decision making authority.

The "CNN effect" often embarrassingly brings an event to the White House, State Department or Department of Defense Press Briefing rooms before it has been received by the administration through diplomatic, military or intelligence channels. Answers are demanded before the situation is even known, let alone studied. This trend towards "foreign policy live" can thwart diplomatic efforts, compromise military deployments and promote partisan sniping.

"Spinning the press" has become viewed as an unpredictable, contradictory, self-serving attempt to legitimize power politics with "ethical" explanations. This is not new. It is one of the legacies of Vietnam that each administration has chosen to continue, but it is not without a significant cost. For both the domestic and international public, as well as foreign leaders, "spin" causes confusion over who is formulating foreign policy. ¹⁵ The administration sees its efforts to "spin the press" as a valid means to inform the public and to "send political messages to foreign leaders." Some of the insiders to this process describe it also as a means to limit political damage, "to float foreign policy trial balloons," and "to admit to lesser truths in order to cover the greater lie." Such an environment makes long-term foreign policy less clear.

This dynamic atmosphere can give the appearance of a perpetual "ad hocracy" in American foreign policy. Some suggest that it is the nature of modern, high-speed communications, both public and private, which has irrevocably changed forever the way we formulate and execute foreign policy. Some call efforts to improve the system futile. There is the claim that an uninformed opinion of a policy maker (or influencer) in the National Security Council or the 7th Floor of the State Department can override the best efforts of all concerned. So why bother?

Others have suggested that with virtual reality technologies the permanent overseas presence of a large diplomatic corps is a thing of the past. ¹⁶ Complementary strategic military intervention capabilities allow us to rapidly deploy our US-based forces to wherever they are needed. This concept would have us conduct all our foreign policy safely from within "Fortress America". Indeed, "much virtual diplomacy takes now place through press conferences and soundbites administered by senior officials and government spokespersons," according to Daniel R. Russell. ¹⁷

However, the discussion in this paper is neither narrowly focused on our abilities to use the advances in technology, nor on the concern that significant and fundamental improvements to strategy and foreign policy formulation and execution are somehow beyond us. It is grounded in the belief that both diplomacy and warfare similarly depend on both long-range effects and, when the contested issues are personality and agenda dependent, on face-to-face human interactions.

The seemingly psychotic US foreign policy shifts of the last decade have not been brought on solely by technology. With the end of the Cold War as a backdrop, other domestic factors have certainly become more significant. The key American foreign policy factors of the 1990s include a government frequently divided along partisan lines, a decline in public concern for foreign policy, the increasing complexity of world issues and the "age-old congressional-executive struggle". These factors may have prevented America from reestablishing the strategic outlook needed to assume a stronger international role. However, each generation perceives its case to be unique until it recognizes the patterns of their time in history. Today plenty of people assume that the role of the United States in international affairs is strong enough that they would question the need to have a strategy.

In many ways, America's foreign policy today most resembles its ineffectual post-WW I period, when neither diplomacy nor military strategy matched the optimism and opportunities created by the great conflict's termination. The unrealized greater expectations from peoples around the world, uplifted temporarily by the Cold War's end, has lead to even greater frustrations. The growth of potential conflicts only increases the necessity for a more effective foreign policy community that is equally capable of formulating and executing a strategy which best serves the US national interests.

THE STRATEGIC BALANCE -- DIPLOMACY AND MILITARY STRATEGY

The main examination of this study, the relevance of strategy to the relationship between force and diplomacy, may be thwarted by a false assumption: whether diplomatic imperatives (defined as critical national interests achievable through foreign policy) truly drive US military strategy, and whether

these diplomatic imperatives are driven by a clear national interest. Theoretically, the answer is always "yes", but most of our recent history appears to contradict such an optimistic response. Just as there is fog and friction to war, there are great challenges to foreign policy, both in its formulation and in its execution. Some of these challenges are institutional, and others are idiosyncratic. ¹⁹ However, there has always been some that opine that fog is the very nature of foreign policy and to try to make sense out of it is futile. Jonathan Clarke warned against this in 1993 when he wrote,

Professional diplomats often say that trying to think strategically about foreign policy is a waste of time. Each and every problem is different, and the best one can hope for is to muddle through—"pasted-together diplomacy," in former Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger's colorful phrase. Unfortunately, the Bosnian experience has demonstrated what happens when foreign policy is made on the fly: directionless vacillation between cowboy and wimp. In point of fact, a successful foreign policy requires an intellectual underpinning or mooring in a vision of the country's mission in the world. The lesson from Bosnia is that this is not merely an academic exercise but an important practical necessity. As yet there is no sign that anyone at the top of the Administration is ready to step back from all-night caucusing and take on the calm, deliberative task that would produce the required new strategic concept.²⁰

Any strategy or policy has to first start with a definition of national interests. However, with growing multiculturalism and partisanism in the United States, defining this national interest is much more difficult today. As Daniel R. Russell argues, "Internal fragmentation makes it harder to sell the idea of a unified national interest. National interest can look quite different to different groups. Natural champions of one cause are natural opponents of another." This argument overlooks the fact that policy is frequently a tool used to overcome a conflict of wills and that the lack of a clear policy more often than not leads to indecision, vacillation and reversals.

The real danger is that we will not have prepared a full range of diplomatic and economic policy options to be used in crises and that we will not have a national strategy to organize and direct these options. The goal should be to provide "an enlarged operational toolbox for Foreign Service officers, in order to minimize the need to resort to force." As one senior State Department Foreign Service Officer working with the military observed,

Arguably, the U.S. military would itself become more supportive of and effective in a process in which it is no longer the customary tool of choice, deployed at the 11th hour, for a mission whose end-state is often unforeseen or at best nebulous.²²

Conceptually, no one would argue that military force is anything short of being what General Henry Shelton called the "hammer in the foreign policy toolbox," the implied threat backing up diplomacy between the world's major powers. Nor would they debate the flexibility inherent in a full-spectrum military's usefulness for a wide range of non-war foreign policy options, such as show of force, security assistance, humanitarian and disaster relief, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, peacekeeping and various nation-building or confidence-building projects. However, the failure to define and apply an understanding of national interest has handicapped the foreign policy and military strategy of the United States since the end of the Cold War.

There is continued confusion over how to define the national interest. Even the National Security Advisor, Mr. Samuel (Sandy) Berger, made a very unconvincing pitch to Jim Lehrer who asked him to identify the US interests in the Kosovo saying, "We fought one war that started in the Balkans. So, number one, this is a conflict which if we can squelch early now, unlike Bosnia, which burned on for three years, I think we can prevent it from widening. I remember in the late days of the Bush administration being told this is really the spot that they were concerned about."²⁴ Whether Kosovo would have triggered a more costly war in Europe into which the US would have been drawn by its vital national interest is not evident from his argument. It also serves to highlight the fact that we now lack clear criteria for choice between foreign policy options.

With such reasoning it is easy to understand why and how the American military has been employed in a conceptual vacuum during the last ten years. Lacking a national strategy, this well-organized, superbly trained and most expensively equipped force has continued to operate on autopilot. It will continue to request concrete "exit strategies" that do not exist. The measured and deliberate use of military force in Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo was not matched by attainable political endstates. The military services compete to find a new azimuth from the last known course set during the Cold War when either status quo through armed deterrence, or if necessary, battlefield violence, would prevent a hostile power from gaining regional hegemonic domination. However, today's changed conditions dictate that a new national security strategy be determined to avoid continuing in directions that no longer serve, or may even become contrary to the political purpose. Thus, predicting, detecting and measuring the gap between military effects and the political endstate becomes key to understanding the military's supporting role in foreign policy.

Public Fear of Military Policy-Making

Suspicion and distrust of the military has long been an American political preoccupation. It was reflected in Samuel Adams' writings in 1776 as he stated, "Soldiers are apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of the Citizens... Such a Power should be watched with a jealous Eye." As revealed over 200 years later in the "Project on the Gap Between the Military and Civilian Society" there is a belief by many that the military has a desire to cross the line of "traditional understanding of civilian control" in policy formulation. In this interpretation, the military goes beyond providing neutral advice to "insist and advocate" when and how to use force. Interestingly, the authors of the study frame it entirely in their subjective definition of tradition while failing to determine the role of today's military in policy formulation. They simply automatically assume that it would be bad for the military to advocate a policy instead of just following orders given to them to execute. Having assumed this conclusion, they then proceed to prove it with empirical data derived from surveys.

Is this simply a classic case of form over function that is obvious now that the Cold War is over? Of bureaucratic inertia that makes meaningful and necessary change next to impossible? A more sinister interpretation would suggest that the American military has forgotten their Constitutional loyalty and

unquestioning subordination to civilian leadership and authority. It is not uncommon for Americans to blame excessive military influence for poor political decisions such as the Vietnam War. Who can blame some of our citizens for being concerned when the militaries of the world "directly control the most powerful instruments of coercion within most societies"?²⁵

Let us first examine the question of loyalty and then the issue of the military's political setting. First, from the previously cited Triangle Institute for Security Studies source, the American people can rest assured of the loyalty of their military to the nation and its democratic processes. For American military officers the case is obvious; they assume their loyalty to the Constitution is unquestioned. Even in today's partisan circumstances, where the elites of the American military have become overwhelmingly "Republicanized" (a term coined in the TISS study) from the 1970s and 1980s, and now operate under an administration in the 1990s that was initially characterized as "anti-military", there is no military-political confrontation. This point is an important premise to acknowledge when discussing our Constitutional safeguards and the limits of the military's role in national policy formulation.

This role has increased in today's complex world and now frequently requires military teaming in the formulation of national strategy and foreign policy. As described recently by retired Colonel William Clontz, former US Military Advisor to Madelaine Albright during her role as our United States Ambassador to the United Nations:

The role of the military in diplomacy is clearly limited by the Constitutional tradition to one of support and advice, but the reality of modern life dictates more of a partnership than might be evident at first look. Many civilian decision makers have no military background whatsoever and many are transient in their positions of responsibility. This means more discretion devolves to military leaders by default. Nevertheless, it is essential that military partners in the diplomatic process keep firmly oriented on their role in supporting elected and appointed officials.... By the same token, civilian leaders need to recognize the long tenure, personal investments, and institutional equity the military has in diplomacy. Simply treating the military as hired hands that are there to offer technical advice and to take orders will inevitably lead to tensions, less than stellar results, and an absence of internal dialogue that hurts all concerned. 26

The requirement for astute yet neutral military input serves both the civilian policy maker and the military. The dangers of one or the other "crossing the line" have long been an American preoccupation. Our Founding Fathers made every effort to avoid allowing the military to become a tool of the Executive, to keep the American military a people's military under the people's representatives. This "American way of war" expounded by Madison in the Federalist Papers, continues to serve as the philosophical basis for American military thought.²⁷

Second, today's military leaders are intellectually aware. They are schooled in the admonitions of Thucidydes, Napoleon and Clausewitz. Their approach to military strategy formulation is both philosophic and scientific, finding its place nested with diplomacy and economic policy to support a national or "Grand Strategy". We have a coordinated document called the National Security Strategy from which was

^{*} Some strategists reserve the term "Grand Strategy" for nuclear deterrence and warfighting strategies.

developed the National Military Strategy. Yet some critics have claimed that the overall context of this strategic effort is "directionless." They believe that there is no foreign policy, and there is no organizing national strategy for a military strategy, diplomacy or economic policy to support.

The Need for Strategy

Is this concern over the absence of a valid national strategy new or are we returning to an American predisposition against strategy? Before World War II, Americans assumed a strategy was a hostile "thing" that was only required in wartime. Since Americans intended to stay out of war, there was no need for a strategy in peacetime. Two cataclysmic events shook this perception: the attack on Pearl Harbor and our rude entrance into the nuclear age.

The former event destroyed our belief that America could remain willingly aloof from the nations of the world; the latter event, less than four years later, charged the United States with the moral responsibility for safeguarding the world from the incinerating genie whom we had set free. A genie that could never be put back into the bottle – the now permanent nuclear fact in strategy.²⁹

Following World War II the role of national strategy was principally to contain the Soviet Union's spread of communism and to deter nuclear war. Failing deterrence, the strategy had to transition to win the resultant war against the Soviet Union, by both nuclear and conventional means³⁰. Against a clearly recognizable foe we were able to unify our military strategy, diplomacy and economic policy.

As such, most supporting or enabling concepts were conveniently focused on a single national strategy. The potentially horrific consequences of failure under the ever-present nuclear condition made constant examination and validation of our strategy both a moral and political imperative. This great responsibility was recognized, coordinated and executed under a succession of presidents and their National Security Councils.

The Distortion of Strategy

While nuclear strategy was developing in the 1940s and 1950s, conventional war theorists were losing sight of the Clauswitzian principles of war. The ensuing intellectual confusion, reflected by the Korean Conflict and Vietnam, did not neatly fit previous American models. In his assessment, Colonel (retired) Harry G. Summers felt both Korea and Vietnam were handled by the presidents as unique cases, a framework which lead to abandoning both strategy and American civil-military traditions. Specifically, by not requesting Congress declare war and enlisting the full support of the American people, he suggests these wars were not in the "American way of war", but more closely resembled 18th Century European exclusive warfare between sovereign heads of state. His conclusion was that in the long run, both wars may have reminded us that without a strategy and the consent of the American people, complex political objectives are unobtainable by force alone.

Over time, the mechanisms for promulgating the supporting military strategy became well embedded in the Defense structure. The mantra of "ends, ways and means" matched the overall force requirements to the larger theory. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's "Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)" matched to the force requirements to time-phased resourcing from Congress. Within DoD, the process became both clinical and pervasive, requiring an ever larger corps of indoctrinated bureaucrats to develop requirements, to seek Congressional resourcing, to program expenditures and then, to monitor budget execution.

Members of this bureaucracy are often convinced that the United States Government has a coherent national strategy. "Of course there is," they answer, "We can show you the 'ends, ways and means." Inevitably, the "ways and ends" are confused and frequently turn out to be vague and inadequate terms, such as "multilateralism", "engagement" or "democratization." These themes do provide an intellectual purpose: they fill the vacuum of the model and allow it to keep working. However, these are not strategies at all, but simply current policy themes that lack the necessary precision to unify military strategy, diplomacy and economic policy towards a distinct purpose. They may, in fact, be the substitution of "operational styles" for a defined and unifying national strategy. As long as there is no imminent armed conflict, this intellectual slight-of-hand can continue indefinitely.

Operational Styles Substituting for Strategy

Other tools may be taking the place of strategy and empowering the use of "operational styles". The Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD 56), *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, was not originally intended to be a principal foreign policy tool, but both by default and by its obvious potential, has developed into one. In treating the difficulties of the interagency process in complex contingencies it recognizes the major relational issues, but its lack of firm directive authority causes it to fall short of creating the desired foreign policy synergy. Whether it will be continued under one name or another into further administrations and effectively refined is a question only the next president can answer.

Some suggest the reason that PDD-56 is still in its infancy as an organizing policy tool is that neither the presidents of the 1990s nor their National Security Councils have provided the necessary strong leadership to overcome the cultural resistance and bureaucratic in-fighting of the inter-agency community. Whether PDD 56's vagueness was deliberate or not is open to interpretation. Others insist the key reason is that the Executive Branch's one-time lead agency for implementation of foreign policy, the US Department of State, an agency incredibly rich in individual creative and intellectual talent, is simultaneously a seriously flawed and poorly resourced organization. One knowledgeable observer claims that "(the U.S. Department of) State is on the verge of becoming a mere tactical partner in complex contingency operations." Others believe that has already happened.

INSTITUTIONAL AND OPERATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DOD AND STATE

Defense has a culture of education and planning. It values and rewards teamwork. Members are encouraged to meet additional qualifications before they come to the field. Education takes place systematically and regularly along a career path. Success is often defined by selection to ever-higher levels of professional education. Joint assignments are valued and specifically rewarded in the promotion system. While this culture serves the military purpose, it is diametrically opposed to the culture at the Department of State.

One Foreign Service Officer, Douglas A. Hartwick, wrote that there were five State Department traits that military personnel needed to understand in order to bridge the communication gap. First, "that diplomats are comfortable with ambiguity," that gray area which allows for compromise. Second, that "State types are thinkers, not planners." Third, that the "individual is King at State." State has a culture of concepts; it values individual creativity. Fourth, that "State Officers don't 'train', they work." Their officers are encouraged to skip training to get to the field as quickly as possible and learn on the job. The fifth trait is the most apparent to the military, that there is "little military experience at State."

The only required training is either for entry-level officers or for very senior personnel. However, there is no hierarchy of training to progressively develop an FSO along their career. In fact, according to Hartwick, "With the emphasis placed on individual performance and managing issues, not people, the State Department has long experienced difficulty in coaxing its officers to undertake training." Institutionally, State does not reward training as much as it does performance and its "best officers... see greater value in genuine work slots to demonstrate job performance." Time away from the key political or economic positions is viewed negatively and thus, inter-agency assignments are undervalued and underrewarded.

Knowing that these differences exist, other tools have been attempted as bridges between these different cultures, but not all have proven successful. One was an intended budgetary linkage between the State Department and the Department of Defense that has disappeared. In the Johnson Administration of the 1960s, the same PPBS program that McNamara used at Defense was also applied to State. Mysteriously and unfortunately, State's PPBS program was dropped, much to the obvious detriment of their future budgeting process, but also perhaps, to our foreign policy as a whole. The PPBS system was one of the few mechanisms with the potential to present a common foreign policy approach from the Executive to the Legislative Branch for appropriate resourcing. So there is a fundamental disconnect in diplomacy's checkbook.

These differences cause DoD and DoS operational mismatches to be made more severe by an imbalance of resources. Even if State wanted to match Defense's culture of education and planning, they could not. Nearly every report by the Secretary of State to Congress during the past several years has been accompanied by a plea for better funding for both DoS and their traditional foreign aid programs. With no national agenda for foreign policy, and no easily identifiable external threat for the American public to identify, the once easy to approve foreign aid programs now have to be couched in purely

domestic terms. As our Secretary of State recently testified to Congress: "You know the term "foreign aid" has become virtually obsolete in the context of our international affairs programs today. Because when we fight proliferation, drug trafficking, terrorism, disease, and crime – we aid America." 33

This perennial lack of resources, manifest especially in the severe shortage of Foreign Service personnel, causes severe organizational mismatches with the Defense Department. DoD clearly has three organizational levels, strategic (represented by the Washington-based Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense), operational (represented by the regional Theater CinCs, the "warfighting headquarters"), and tactical (represented by Joint Task Forces and units). Although issues overlap frequently, and the speed of operations and technology sometimes blur the boundaries between them, these three levels of war are a distinct and convenient convention, with execution by different commanders at different geographic locations. This has implications for the DoD-State interface.

The State Department certainly lacks the key resources to create planning staffs. Today's Policy Planning Staff, now unfaithful to Marshall's original purpose of long-term strategic analysis, deals on short term and reactive issues. Much of their creative effort is taken up with speech writing. This shift is significant. It has destroyed the State Department's only mechanism capable of driving long-term foreign policy planning. Until recently, even intermediate planning, the backbone of military preparedness for crisis operations, was virtually unknown in State. Future estimates and forecasting are still largely absent, not even able to influence budget requests to Congress for the outyear language training requirements or professional development training courses needed by Foreign Service Officers (FSO). This poses more of a dilemma for DoD than for State. While State has become an implementer of a malleable and fluid foreign policy developed by the NSC and inter-agency process, Defense has to conduct specific, long-range and resource-intensive planning.

Relationship Between the Regional CinC and State

A significant mismatch in organizations appears when we consider the roles of the CinC (Commander-in-Chief) and State in operational matters. For the State Department it is less important to specify the distinction between hierarchical levels, and this causes confusion for military planners and commanders. The Washington-based diplomats and senior civilians handle policy (strategic level) issues, just as it is in the military. But for the State Department, the operational level (which corresponds to the military's regional CinC) is usually handled in Washington, DC, sometimes by the same personnel who develop policy. On other occasions, operational level authority is assumed by the ambassador in country or shared with Washington by subject, phase or event. The military's Joint Staff and the Theater CinCs are thereby faced with a dilemma: without a separate, clear and distinct State Department operational level, with whom does the Theater CinC resolve operational military-diplomatic issues?

To the State Department, the military created the CinC structure in an arbitrary manner. To diplomats this was an artificial and constantly changing structure and perhaps too rigid by nature. As explained by one observer who has bridged both communities in his career, Colonel Norm St. Pierre:

The State operational level is probably the region (Assistant Secretaries and Deputy Assistant Secretaries). Regional lines are not parallel for any agency in Washington either. As a result, there is an increasing amount of work being done to bring cohesion between CinC Theater Engagement Plans and Bureau Performance Plans. Finally, the CINCs are very active nowadays and call on embassies often... the problem is that most ambassadors are actually nowhere as steeped in their area as the CinC is in his.³⁵

Certainly, the Ambassador may view this as an organizational mismatch in the region and even wonder at the difference in views held by the CinC and the Assistant Secretary of State for that region. According to some, it can become a sensitive issue and sometimes, an unwanted power struggle. Once again, the imbalance of resources can cause friction. As one former American ambassador explained it, "There are ambassadors who have next to no discretionary funds while their military Security Assistance Officer (SAO) may have tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars in Security Assistance Program assets" (such as International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, Excess Defense Articles, Joint/Combined Exercises and Training). Interestingly, the first two programs are actually funded by requests from the State Department to Congress. The funds are given to State, but then transferred to DoD.

Notwithstanding the source and authorization of these funds, it is the military that is charged with the programs' execution. When the SAO is also the Military Attaché, the Ambassador naturally has close and continuous contact with him. To most military attachés, even with as many hats as they wear, there is no doubt that they work principally for the ambassador. There are notable exceptions to this perception, not uncommonly at dysfunctional embassies with fractured Country Teams.

However, when there is a separate SAO from the Defense Attaché Office, the dangerous perception can develop that the SAO's greater loyalty to the regional CinC might conflict with their support and loyalty to the ambassador in country. Except in the unique case of South Korea, where the CinC and the ambassador share the same peacetime area of responsibility, when there are differences, neither the ambassador nor the CinC has an equivalent counterpart. The Joint Staff discourage the CinCs from addressing issues directly with Assistant Secretaries of State, let alone an Under Secretary of State. It is therefore no surprise that ambassadors usually prefer that their own military attaché is dual-hatted as the SAO.

Bridging Gaps: State Department Efforts with the Military

To some, the issue of military-diplomatic disconnects is simply a problem of the military's strict interpretation of the "chain of command" under their structure of a Joint Staff and a Secretary of Defense. State Department personnel often point to the bridges they have built to overcome these gaps. As highlighted by someone with experience at both DoD and DOS, Mr. Norm St. Pierre, "each CinC has a POLAD (a Political Advisor, usually ambassador rank) assigned to him as a gateway. Also, each (military) Service Chief now has a political officer on his staff assigned from the State Department." Another

insider to the DoD side of the issue has suggested that it is not State, but military reluctance in allowing another non-DoD department to have too great an influence in the CinC's business.

Compounding this problem is the natural difficulty with creating and implementing an integrated State Department complement to the CinC's Theater Engagement Plan (TEP). Established in 1997 by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, each regional CinC and the CinC of Special Operations Command were directed to prepare their Theater Engagement Plans to "establish theater objectives and list annual activities/programs between the US and individual foreign military establishments projected for a five-year period."

More recently, the State Department has introduced annual Mission, Regional and Bureau Performance Plans. Full coordination with all the CinCs may be yet incomplete, but as Mr. St. Pierre says, "We've come a long way in getting the CinCs to coordinate on these to have CinCs break down their own TEPs into regional and country plans." 40

Here we need to return to the issue of the imbalance of resources in foreign policy. Not only do the Defense programs predominate in peacetime; they have become the tools of choice during a crisis. As mentioned previously, State has long operated with such a severe shortage of personnel that they cannot perform even intermediate range planning. The State Department system can perhaps handle the "crisis of the day", but "rapidly becomes overloaded during a major complex emergency." As one CinC's POLAD (Political Advisor) explained it,

Increasingly, our approach to regional conflict has been to lurch from mini-crisis to minicrisis, pushing deeper engagement down the road six months at a time. The use of military force has become our sole real trump card, and the desirability of military presence seems to be the measure of whether or not we will become involved."

The immediacy of armed conflict does not necessarily end the political contests between the twin hierarchies of State and Defense, nor of policy levels with operational levels. Most diplomats are more than aware of the need for credible force to back up their words. Less obvious to the military mind is the absolute need for military actions to be measured against the non-military national interests at stake.

On one hand we have seen where a foreign military threat can be a unifying "raison d'être" for diplomats and military to work closely together, such as in Korea during the tense 1994 summer. On the other hand, we have seen instances of incredible political and inter-agency infighting even as battlefield casualties were mounting, as during our 1983 intervention in Beirut and ten years later in Mogadishu. It is obvious that these two communities, the traditional "twin pillars" of American foreign policy, think and reason fundamentally different. What is less obvious is that the pronouncements of these two agencies frequently merely reflect the contradictory thoughts of the president and the National Security Council. Once again, the concept of two discrete communities with clear dividing lines in policy formulation becomes an outdated and confusing metaphor.

INTELLECTUAL DIFFERENCES OF MILITARY AND FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICERS

It is important to note that Military and Foreign Service Officers need to be different. In extreme cases, they are operating at polar opposites and no single mindset could be counted on to operate effectively at both ends of this complex spectrum. At its core, it is not a crisis, but a healthy tension that ultimately creates success in their separate domains. Yet this view is seldom understood and respected.

There are undoubtedly separate and distinct State and Defense stereotypical mentalities. It is the failure to recognize the value and purpose of these differences that has led to a negative perception of the warrior-diplomat culture gap. Anecdotal information highlights a wide range of perceptions of this difference, from mild amusement to open and hostile contempt. This difference between warriors and diplomats is certainly more than just institutional; it marks a fundamental difference in human behavior.

Essentially, Defense and State each recruit, train, develop and reward a distinctly different personality. Many of the personality and intellectual virtues are shared, but there is a fundamental difference which normally goes either unrecognized or unspoken until an opportunity arises when these two distinct personalities work together, as in this example:

An interagency meeting is called. DoD and DOS personnel are in attendance and are discussing national security policy, let's say on what our posture should be vis-à-vis Iran. The military personnel arrive on time with charts, handouts, overhead transparencies and every point they want to make outlined on paper. The DOS personnel straggle in, some on time, some a few minutes late, with little or nothing in writing, ideas that are all over the map and no set presentation. They may not know exactly what they want to get out of the meeting, but they do know that they want a discussion that will generate ideas. The military sees the state folks as completely unorganized and the discussion as rambling. The state personnel see the military folks as myopic, unable to brainstorm, with an inflexible approach and rigid ideas. Both sides are frustrated and leave feeling that the other had little to contribute to a productive outcome or a decision on how to handle relations with Iran. 46

As long as some warriors and diplomats view each other contemptuously, "without the awareness that we are supposed to be different," our national's interests are poorly served. Few warriors or diplomats consider themselves to be skilled in both disciplines, nor do they particularly desire to be. For the warrior to be considered "too diplomatic" or the diplomat to be considered "too aggressive" are anotherms to both communities.

Warrior and Diplomat Personality Types

Miscalculation or miscommunication can easily and dramatically increase the probability of armed conflict. Thus, reducing cultural miscommunications between our military and Foreign Service officers becomes an important first step. There is a considerable amount of empirical data to explain each culture. Often the Myers-Briggs test is used as a basis to categorize these differences.

Behavioral testing has shown that some 65% of military leaders fit either the "ISTJ" or "ESTJ" (Introverted or Extroverted, Sensing, Thinking, Judgmental) personality profile of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) while 47% of the Foreign Service officers are "INTJ" (Introverted, Intuitive, Thinking,

Judgmental). That seemingly small difference of how they receive their informational inputs, between "sensation" and "intuition" provides an important understanding to the different perceptual approach of these two groups of officers and their organizations.

The military is action-oriented, predictive and well resourced to provided a culture of education and planning. Doctrine is highly debated and constantly tweaked. Doctrinal knowledge is only valued in those officers who can pragmatically apply it on the ground. They seek concrete results. Just as they get only one chance in a battle to win, they go into meetings and briefings prepared to take advantage of their one opportunity to win. The typical military personality, focused on facts, history and experience, demands and expects a "generally clear, definable and achievable" endstate.

After ten years in units as subalterns, selected military officers spend a year in school (Staff Colleges) to learn the intellectual discipline of the "Military Decision-Making process" and then return to units and headquarters to practice it under both harsh field and command-post examinations. "They seem to operate at highest efficiency when employing a step-by-step approach...(and) are easily frustrated by the inconsistencies of others." This pragmatic and quantifiable approach determines specific military objectives and is indispensable for winning battles:

What military personnel deal with in a war-fighting context is very much the here and now. Synchronizing and sequencing of operations is critical. When it is decided that X military objective must be attained by a certain time and on a certain date, preliminary steps are backward-planned to ensure that all elements are in place and prepared when the deadline for action is reached. Incomplete planning or failure to fully coordinate specific events will result in mission failure and possible loss of life.⁴⁷

In contrast, the diplomat is concept oriented and reactive. "Their talk is their action." They seek to put the "right words" or "send the right message" that fits a foreign policy concept or theme. "Generally they would much rather write about, think about, or even improve upon any of these ideas than engage in the actual process." The military's virtues of "team building, goal setting, and time management are all marvelous concepts - for others." As one FSO wrote in explaining it.

To set priorities is admirable and essential but must not be confused with the dynamic operation of real-world prioritizing. The world will always conspire to throw a curveball. The most sagacious theory and ingenious paradigm will be tucked into a back pocket as a stream of challenges forces itself upon policymakers, who must confront the fact that prioritization is often a series of Hobson's choices between terrible alternatives. This is not to downplay the importance of guiding principles; without a considered set of abiding objectives and specific goals, we are floundering, not functioning. But the gravity of grand principles must be mated with the agility of astute tactics in order to deal with the real world. ⁵⁰

The typical military planner applauds flexibility, but views this much creative individuality as excessive. To them, intellectual indiscipline frustrates the orderly working of a well-defined system. They fail to recognize that this personality difference is beneficial for the distinct and separate purposes of diplomacy. "Likewise, it is important that diplomatic personnel are more intuitive." The typical FSO shuns rote process for the intellectual effort and values the individual creative effort far above any

teamwork or managerial approach. They think nothing about being late for a meeting if they were on the phone with someone important. They are liable to cancel a meeting at the last minute without giving it a second thought about who might be inconvenienced. Contacts and personal relationships are more important than understanding the hierarchy represented on an organizational chart. As one behavioral study explained,

In their work, they deal directly on a personal level with foreign leaders. The ability to understand and analyze the personalities of the contacts, with whom they work and seek to influence, is critical to their success. They must be able to take a longer view, to fully explore options and to understand the consequences of choosing one option over the other in the "bigger picture"... Rarely are diplomatic issues resolved in a quantifiable, pragmatic way. Rather, the process of diplomacy is messy, time consuming, chaotic, and the results might be left a bit murky on purpose... ⁵²

Those who seek an orderly system of foreign policy today are destined to be frustrated. It has become a dynamic and constantly changing arena between Congress, the President, his National Security Council, his Secretaries of State and Defense, other federal agencies, IGOs (international governmental organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, and the International Committee of the Red Cross), NGOs (Non-Governmental Organizations), the Press, domestic single interest groups, business corporations, governors, mayors and not to forget, the foreign nations involved. This fluid situation where the power of any fixed structure over a particular issue is only temporal, favors the creative INTJ personality frequently found in the State Department FSO, and frustrates the doctrinaire ESTJ/ISTJ personality common to the military. Yet the preference of the INTJ to react, as opposed to plan and forecast long-term events, means that the ESTJ/ISTJs will have no shortage of crises to which to react.

On the other hand, pronouncements by military personnel over the years have given diplomats plenty of concern. The more egregious statements might give wonder to whether the military mind was capable of effective partnering with diplomats. Dean Acheson in his book, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*, gives us two examples from 1950 which caused problems both domestically and with our allies: "In August Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews in a speech in Boston called for preventive war. He was made Ambassador to Ireland. Then General Orville Anderson, Commandant of the Air War College, announced that the Air Force, equipped and ready, only awaited orders to drop its bombs on Moscow. He was retired." 53

Dean Acheson also wrote passionately about how some military virtues were indispensable at the State Department, but simultaneously drew the line at what he called, "the military mind." An example of this difference is found in his description of General (Secretary of State) George C. Marshall:

Nor did General Marshall have what is generally thought of as a military type of mind. Perhaps no great soldiers have it. General Bradley does not. Both subjected themselves to the most severe self-discipline. They were both impatient with a type of nonsense particularly prevalent in the State Department known as "kicking the problem around." All of us who have worked with General Marshall have reported a recurring outburst of his: "Don't fight the problem, gentlemen. Solve it!" With him the time to be devoted to analysis

of a problem, to balancing "on the one hand" against "on the other," was definitely limited. The discussion he wanted was about plans of action and must follow staff work. 54

How Limited Budget Resources Exacerbate the Intellectual Differences

Both budgetary and cultural differences between Defense and State compound the problem of training together. The peacetime surplus of military officers allows purely military training exercises to be close simulations of reality-based scenarios. On the other hand, there are so few Foreign Service Officers that they can barely keep their critical posts filled. As one POLAD (Political Advisor from the State Department to the military) familiar with this difference lamented.

Symptomatic of our failure to keep pace, State rarely – and then only cursorily – exercises its crisis management capabilities. The Department only sporadically provides FSOs with opportunities to participate in other agencies' crisis exercises, in part due to chronic personnel shortages, but mostly as a result of our failure to appreciate and reward such training. This sad fact stands in stark contrast to the vigorous and regular program of the Defense Department to exercise and validate its capabilities, strategies, and doctrines. While DoD enjoys a deeper bench than State, allowing the military to fill staffing gaps more readily, the Pentagon demands and then rewards this behavior. ⁵⁵

Even with the availability of today's virtual and communications technologies, it is indeed unusual to have a diplomatic staff participate in a military exercise. So there is little human interface and contact that brings these two cultures into contact until they inevitably meet in contests over foreign policy execution.

Both publicly and privately, many State Department personnel have expressed their frustration with the military. They point to the recent high casualty rate among State Department FSOs in Bosnia and Africa compared to the belief of a risk-avoidance military. As American Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright exasperatedly asked General Colin Powell during the Bosnia crisis, "What's the point in having this superb military that you're always talking about if you can't use it?"

UNDERSTANDING THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Unintended consequences of this culture gap may lead the United States directly to unnecessary armed conflict. The diplomat who tries to use the military to "send a message" may be met by the military general who may not first question whether the national interest is served, and provides no policy feedback to the diplomat. Military education creates officers eager to "take prudent steps to prepare for the worst scenario." Military officers believe in a moral imperative to protect their soldiers - usually by positioning or employing overwhelming force.

Yet these military steps may be so provocative to the opponent that a tense situation is escalated. As forces close and indicators of coercive intent (the diplomat's message) are identified by an opponent, his counteractions (the second order effect) may too rapidly or surprisingly reduce the available friendly policy options. The worst case scenario becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy when the intended political message is overshadowed by miscommunication. The previous value of deterrence can be overcome by the inertia of a perceived direct military threat.

To avoid this strategic error, the military's first question to the diplomat or policy maker must be, "What is our national interest: what endstate do you want?" Certainly, this key question, if indeed ever posed, was not fully answered in the cases of 1950's Korea, 1960's Vietnam or present day Iraq, Pakistan, Indonesia, Colombia, Taiwan, Bosnia, or Kosovo/Serbia. The questions on Russia and Iran have yet to even be posed. One might say, "If NATO is the answer, what is the question?" ⁵⁸

Strategy requires the warrior, diplomat and policy maker to understand one another in both theoretical and concrete terms. In the past, the national interest was defined in a formal document that was further elaborated in the form of a written national strategy. This allowed military strategy, diplomacy and economic policy to be mutually supportive at strategic, operational and sometimes, even at tactical levels. Today this relationship is more complex and problematic.

Political Themes versus National Interest

Military and diplomatic personnel frequently differ on how they view the need for a defined strategy. However, it may simply be that diplomatic personnel are less bound to a formal strategy system and more attuned to an administration's operational style. One indication came from discussions with senior State Department officials⁵⁹ responsible for American foreign policy planning. It was suggested to them that "democracy" might be a "means"; a means towards our desired endstate of peace secured by the presence of large, successful middle classes with a vested interest in liberal constitutionalism, rule of law, protection of human rights and a free-market system. The suggestion here was that as noble as democracy might be towards improving the conditions of mankind, to a strategist, the promulgation of democracy is fundamentally a logical means towards greater stability. Tellingly, a senior State Department foreign policy planner rejected this out of hand. "No," he repeated, "Democracy is not a means. It is an end in itself." Such a statement would cause frustration for someone seeking to use a defined process to arrive at national strategy, but is clearly in keeping with the President's articulated priorities.

The strategic dilemma always occurs when ends and means are confused. If democracy has become an "end in itself" for this administration, then as a stability strategy, this construct is deceptive and can easily blind both policy makers and foreign policy practitioners. In today's world, 60% of all countries can technically, if somewhat dubiously, claim to be a democracy. However, two-thirds of these democracies are in serious trouble. A narrow definition of simply whether or not they held free elections grossly ignores whether the democratic movement became hijacked. Support of repressive regimes with illiberal tendencies that wield brutish power instead of law, that lack regard for human rights and enforce a narrow commercialism accessible only to a well-connected or criminal minority are not in our national interest. This condition breeds instability, the exact opposite "end" of any rationally desired stability strategy.

Over the past decade, one that Mikhail Gorbachev fairly and prophetically warned us could become "a Cold Peace," the lack of American global leadership may be the major contributing factor to

the rise of a new class of tyrant - the elected henchman. Now legalistically armed with the votes that brought him to power, they rationalize the brutal subjugation of minorities and ethnicities as the "will of the people" or "of righteous destiny" or "of God." These illiberal democracies pose a constant threat to their own citizens and to their neighbors. Without a national strategy that counters them, supported by a range of diplomatic options that induces these leaders or their constituencies to permanently and peacefully change their behavior, it will eventually be left to the American military to battle them.

Thus, the American military has a vested interest in "shaping the international environment, responding to crises, and preparing now for an uncertain future." This less than nominal military strategy is, quintessentially, a reactive contradiction to the confused or absent national strategy. The lack of American world leadership, under a unifying Grand Strategy to promote stability, will be precisely the root cause of many armed military engagements that otherwise could have been avoided.

Likewise, American diplomats and policy-makers have an overwhelming stake in accurately assessing the political sophistication of their military advisors. At a certain point, conduct of war may be left to generals, but its cause and instigation should never be. Too many senior military men, some in key positions, are unable to calmly identify the higher national interest when they believe a conflict is imminent. Their professional sense of urgency will naturally orient them towards preparation for battle. Winning the war while saving their soldiers' lives is a great moral responsibility that can override what they perceive as riskier and less certain options. Recognizing this must be a fundamental skill in a policy-maker's or diplomat's toolkit. The obsolete metaphor of force and diplomacy being like oil and water can be harmful. Such a mindset would limit diplomatic-military crosstalk at precisely the time when it was most needed. Development of a range of flexible options in a pre-conflict phase tends to be best arrived at by those warriors who can think like diplomats and by those diplomats who can also think like warriors.

THE STRATEGIC SETTING: UN TOUR DE MONDE

Strategic failure is easy to observe. Few conditions are as obvious in proving failed policy than that of unnecessary warfare. However, strategic failure is also not difficult to predict. Complexity overwhelms some analysts and most journalists. It is easier to deal with single foreign policy themes.

In addition to the changing transnational issues, the ever-present asymmetric warfare and the fractionalization of newly independent states, there remains a set of geo-political fundamentals that should not be ignored. Unfortunately, with no perceived need for strategy by the US government today, many of these fundamentals are carelessly brushed aside, at the peril of peace in the coming decade. At stake is whether the threat of major regional, and possibly nuclear, war is becoming more or less likely.

The institutional and intellectual differences between State and DoD come to play in this key issue as they each subjectively predict the results or effects of our foreign policy. When these two institutions are ignorant of the potential benefit of their opposite natures, they tend to explain away the other's interpretation of events as "part of their bias." The resulting cacophony serves to miscue the administration, and often brings a frustrated Congress into the equation to sort out matters. Certainly, this appears to the case of Pakistan. It is one of the best known contemporary examples of Congressional

juxtaposition in foreign affairs. For the critics of legislated foreign policy, it is an example of a poorly-reasoned interference which hampers diplomacy. Since being handicapped by the Pressler Amendment that terminated all US military aid, cooperation and assistance, American diplomats have had little leverage or influence in Pakistan. ⁶² The decade-long ban on Pakistani military students at US military training institutions not only reduces the ties of friendship, but more importantly, it reduces Pakistan's understanding of the military's potential role to support nascent democratic institutions.

Once ostracized by American sanctions driven by legislation, the foreign government then finds itself demonized by the United States, in league with the pariah states who are not only sources of destabilizing weaponry, but also of anti-democratic thought. Thus, the American legal constraint that "punished" Pakistan acts against the promulgation of the very form of government we would normally choose to encourage. Democracy trumps democracy.

WHAT DOES THIS MEAN TO MILITARY STRATEGY AND DIPLOMACY?

The United States' "unipolar moment," let alone "the American Century," is one of those many cases in strategy and statecraft wherein a popular idea can mislead the unwary. The United States today is the sole global superpower. That truth, however, does not suppress entirely the need to pose the classic strategy question, So what? 63

This is not the first period in US history when the military has lacked a guiding national strategy, nor is it likely to be the last. It is simply the first time military officers have been convinced they should not do anything about it. In contrast, immediately prior to our official involvement in World War Two the military realized that the broadly idealistic Atlantic Charter was too nebulous to produce a meaningful military strategy. So the Joint Board developed and codified what they interpreted as the national interest of the United States.⁶⁴

(The) major national objectives of the Untied States (are the) preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial domination; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

This amazing document had the specificity one would expect from the military mind. Yet it suited all three elements of national strategy: military strategy, diplomacy and economic policy. From this framework it is easy to understand why the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Marshall's Policy Planning Staff and the National Security Council were all designed to have a balanced military and diplomatic representation in them.

Over the years the two surviving institutions have been stripped of their strong military presence. During the Cold War the defense establishment moved away from this dynamic intellectual arena, presuming that any advocacy role for the military would be against the American democratic traditions. The trend started by a succession of Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairmen; General Matthew B. Ridgway,

General James Gavin, and General Maxwell Taylor, distanced the military from their civilian leaders by offering purely military advice.

A question that can be asked in hindsight is whether such a strict separation of the military and civilian roles in the formulation of strategy and policy truly served the national interest. The concept of civilian control was perhaps overemphasized, leading General Gavin to comment that "civilian control of the military had progressed to the point where the military professional had been moved so far down the defense structure that truly professional advice seldom found its way through the several layers of civilian officials to the secretary of defense."

Yet the president and other foreign policy players need the military to offer more than purely neutral military advice. General Taylor later explained this in a speech in 1964 when he said:

I do not share the view that each advisor should be a specialist bringing to the table a narrow specialized view of the problem derived from the interests of the agency of government he represents. President Kennedy solved any doubt in the minds of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to his views on the subjects when in April 1961 he wrote to them as follows: 'While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factors without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the over-all context of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.'⁶⁷

In fact, the military's higher educational structure would seem to support President Kennedy's view. The War Colleges of the military services and the joint National Defense University stress the integration of combined elements of national power. Military Fellows are also found at Harvard, Georgetown, Tufts, the U.S. Institute of Peace and the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Certainly, the intellectual preparation appears to be in line with fulfilling precisely that role. However, these numbers are small and the preparation is started late in their careers.

The end of the Cold War requires the development of a new national strategy, not just foreign policy "sound bites." Substitution of an administration's operational style for a long-term strategy is short-sighted. In the absence of a unifying strategy, the military should not wait for one to magically appear. Nor will it, in most probability, unless the defense establishment is prepared to offer sound strategic advice beyond the limits of traditional military objectives and to take the initiative in bringing together the foreign policy community of the Executive Branch. We need a comprehensive approach to strategic planning that incorporates all the players and factors of national power. While DoD has the required resources and planning culture to support this task, their intellectual rigidity and lack of legitimacy in policy-making are significant obstacles to bringing together the entire inter-agency team.

It can be done, but it initially creates twin dilemmas. First, the American military, an action-oriented, resource-, planning- and leadership-rich organization that must absolutely be a majority participant in the process, cannot be the leader of the process. Thus, even for a process from which they would ultimately benefit, one should expect bureaucratic in-fighting and foot-dragging with all the usual Washington justifications: doctrine, principle, policy, power and politics. Second, the political legitimacy of the State Department can only be re-established by reclaiming elements of its lost authority from other federal

agencies, the National Security Council and the National Economic Council. Only a President with strong Congressional support could direct the necessary governmental changes for these divestitures and transfers of authority.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- 1. Expand the PDD 56 process to include inter-agency coordination and permanent relationships outside of the Washington community. In this process a decision should be made whether some permanent National Inter-Agency Operations Center is needed, or if the present system of watch offices, situation rooms and ad hoc teams linked by communications is sufficient. The methodology and technologies needed must be knowledge-focused rather than information-focused or the amount of data may lead to a lessening of the quality of policy and decision making.
- 2. Legislate a "Goldwater-Nichols" Act for the entire foreign policy community to create trained and educated inter-agency foreign policy officers. This act would reward those who meet professional education, training and assignment criteria with enhanced promotion opportunities. It would establish the framework for the requirements-based resourcing of an integrated Foreign Policy Community, to include State Department planning staffs and Inter-Agency positions in order to promote "the State Department's ability to be a strategic, pro-active player in the national security infrastructure."
- 3. Establish a Military-Diplomatic Academy (MDA) under the National Defense University. Its core curricula would be based on the former Army Foreign Area Officer Course. The MDA would be co-located as an institute of resource for the State Department's Foreign Affairs Training Center, for joint training of all Foreign Area/Foreign Service Officers and for senior seminars designed senior officers prior to assignment to key DoD, DoS, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and U.S. Trade Representative and other foreign policy positions.
- 4. Assign the Inter-Agency Training Proponency to the NSC and designate both the National Foreign Affairs Training Center and the Joint Forces Command as the NSC's joint executive agents Their principle task would be to conduct routine training of inter-agency teams in complex contingency operations and develop scenario-based intermediate range political-military options for JCS, SecDef and SecState. Their goal would be to develop a stronger linkage between the strategic policy level, the operational level and the tactical level.
- 5. Reorganize the Army's current Peacekeeping Institute (PKI) into a joint and interagency organization and also place it under the umbrella of the National Defense University. Further study should recommend whether it become part of the Military-Diplomatic Academy or remain a separate institute under the National Defense University.
- 6. Develop statements of national strategy. These strategies must look beyond the present crises and extrapolate actions, policies and programs that contribute to the long-term safety and stability of the United States and of its allies. It would deal both with current opponents and with their probable successors. Ideally, it would shape events to either determine who these new regimes would be, or at least that the conditions for competition with the United States would have changed to our favor. Priority

in creation of these strategies should be to potential areas of conflict, particularly nuclear conflict with the United States or its allies.

7. Link national strategy to military strategy, diplomacy and economic policy through a common, foreign policy community approach to planning and execution, to include a common PPBS system that seeks balanced Congressional resources in order synchronize Executive Branch execution. Confusion over who has the lead in foreign economic policy of the United States must be resolved by the White House. The primary goal in developing a common strategy should clearly be to develop additional nonforce diplomatic options in support of a prioritized list of national interests.

CONCLUSION

It is ultimately dangerous to produce military strategy in a vacuum. However effective a military strategy may be, if it contradicts a nation's foreign and economic policy, then it has failed its vital litmus test: it failed to support the formulation of a unifying national strategy and then acted contrary to our national interests. Under such conditions, these military forces will be capable, if not prone to, fighting and winning battles and wars that ultimately become political failures for the nation.

The paradox is not that the military is not resourced nor intellectually capable of providing interagency leadership in the effort towards a unifying national strategy. Dangerously, and perhaps willfully ignoring the comparison to the failed legal defense of "Befehl ist befehl" by German military officers at Neurenburg, American military officers and civilian defense officials defend the military's neutral role in policy making as "only following orders" of the Executive Branch.

As a general statement of fact, both civilian scholars and government bureaucrats are convinced that "the military should not make policy." The American principle of civilian control over the military is interpreted by these same people as a ban on any military advocacy during policy formulation, with a clear division between military and civilian authority during the final phases of policy creation. Witness the seeming (but not apparent) constitutional challenge offered by State Department personnel to military participants in working groups under the form of the intentionally demeaning question of, "Are you trying to make policy?" The answer from a more courageous military officer should perhaps be, "Yes."

The associated paradox is that in the absence of a national strategy, military strategy becomes one; a riderless horse. DoD can and does develop military strategy which directs specific actions, even though based on vague conceptual guidance which then must be frequently course corrected by strategically contradictory, short-fused reactions by political leaders. The current constant need for interpretation of foreign policy by its practitioners, such as the Theater CinCs, leads them to execute a foreign policy at their level through military means that can conflict with the greater political efforts of American ambassadors in the region.

Thus we return to this paper's first question: Is a specific military strategy still relevant? When it comes to the use of force and of deterring nuclear war, the answer is absolutely and unequivocally "Yes." However, we must understand that the realities of today's dynamic foreign policy environment may not be

able to provide the same unifying national strategy as in the past. The military may have to accept a more fluid "operational style" in the Administration, the State Department and other federal agencies.

A new method for conducting the necessary sanity checks of military strategy may need to be developed if this strategy is no longer neatly "nested" within a larger national strategy. This will be inherently more useful than to keep it within an artificial framework which may no longer apply. It will have to accept that there may be no political endstate to some problems, even by military means. It may best be served by a new approach to an old concept: matching military reality against American idealism. The wisdom of the traditional checks and balances of the American political system seem to apply even more strongly in such an environment.

As vital as their role in warfighting, the CinCs must resist the temptation to view themselves solely as the executors of policy. To do so would leave what the military perceives as valid and reasonable objectives vulnerable to an immediate disconnect with national strategy. Actions of pure military utility can be so provocative, that instead of lending greater stability, they can be the unwitting triggers to an unnecessary war.

Nor is it enough to leave intact the feeble status quo of the Goldwaters-Nichols Act and PDD 56 as the guidelines for Joint and Interagency development. Jointness is still resisted by each military service, and often only the letter of the law, not its intent, is grudgingly met. PDD 56 must be rewritten to include interagency operations outside the Washington, D.C. beltway, must be rigorously enforced by the Executive Branch and must be resourced by Congress. To do this, there must be a statutory counterpart to PDD 56 enacted by Capitol Hill.

Additionally, US foreign policy must be brought in line with our national strategy by removing legislative handcuffs, such as the Presier Amendment before the long-term nuclear instability of this planet becomes irreversible. As Daniel R. Russell warned:

When Congress resorts to legislation as a means of preventing or compelling action by administrations, a host of unwelcome consequences can follow. Issues between nations - intrinsically political – are recast in lawerly terms. Other countries respond in kind, retaliating or passing laws aimed at nullifying the effect of U.S. legislation. The mechanistic structure of legislated sanctions supplants the art of negotiation, inhibits compromise, and leads to undesired outcomes. In some cases, legislation would force the United States to take punitive action without regards to the negative consequences that may follow. 69

Concrete steps must be made to bring nations back down from the edge of nuclear warfare, but these are not legal rules that are enforceable by the rule of law. This will require clear strategic thinking, unified effort, resourcing and even negotiations with rogue and pariah states - the cutting edge of military diplomacy.

For the Joint Staff, it truly is in their best interest to relinquish more authority to the "Warfighting CinCs" to conduct close and continuous coordination with Under Secretaries of State, Assistant Secretaries of State and of other federal agencies. The military can figure out how to keep its chain of command from dissolving during this age of change. Rules and rigidity on the military side are fine, as

long as they deliberately balance the diplomatically beneficial vagueness and flexibility on the State Department side. These military rules must recognize the trickle down effect of an Administration's operational style to the State Department if they ever hope to effectively support it.

This will take a greater JCS acknowledgment of the blurry line between how policy is made and how it is executed. The military is already struggling with the effects of hierarchically-blind technologies such as e-mail, video-teleconferencing and "community-of-interest" collaborative software. JCS should give Joint Forces Command their most important missions - preparing the Joint, Interagency and International framework through training and doctrinal development, and when called upon, fielding true Joint and Interagency Task Forces to meet our nation's international responsibilities.

Joint Forces Command has the potential to develop into a more integrated, interagency C4I entity than the separate Washington agencies or even JCS has a need to be. If JFCOM does live up to its calling as the link between the strategic and the operational levels of both warfighting and peacekeeping, perhaps the day-to-day risk of unnecessary armed conflict, those harmful events which endanger our national interest, will be diminished.

Our foreign policy will be best served when it is recognized that our foreign policy community, although diverse and permanently engaged in debate, need not be rigidly fragmented. Congress and the president can structure the community of foreign policy interest (military, diplomatic, economic, humanitarian) into teams that are educated, trained, resourced and employed together. The infrastructures required already exist, but have never been thoughtfully and thoroughly meshed in a focused, long-term attempt to benefit national, as opposed to agency, interest.

The ideal relationship and purpose, along with a warning of what can happen negatively, was best said by Colonel (Retired) Bill Clontz when he wrote:

Mutual interests should meet in serving national interests, vice institutional interests, in minimizing open conflict between these two elements in the diplomatic arena, in minimizing surprises and lack of options. Conflict most often results when one partner or the other is driven almost exclusively by institutional or process imperatives rather than by larger policy issues. This is exacerbated when the quality of the dialogue is poor or episodic and when there is a lack of understanding why in some case it IS necessary for one or the other to support a short term institutional issue over a broader issue. If there is little trust and confidence in the relationship, these sorts of splits have no reserves of mutual support to draw upon and lead to interagency warfare wherein not sharing information and slow rolling the other side becomes the norm.

Synergies will be further advanced through the informed cooperation of both a strategic dynamic (Executive Branch planning and policy agencies) and a functioning operational dynamic (of CINCs, Assistant Secretaries, Field Agencies and Ambassadors). The promise of this new relationship has yet to be realized. Essentially, this means that the second question remains open: What is the ideal relationship between the military, the Administration, the State Department and Congress in the formulation and execution of foreign policy? This answer will be developed through a complex evolutionary growth within the American political context. The military strongly holds to tradition, but must recognize the inevitable nature of change. However, our purpose as a military, to fight and win our nation's wars, has not

changed, despite those who have wished away warfare and cannot believe the unthinkable will ever happen.

The fundamental requirement of security that provides for our many freedoms is one of the few non-negotiables. Advances in technology, new political theories, rise and fall of alliances, stock exchanges or politicians notwithstanding, our most fundamental task is clear. Beyond this task, whether the military is used as policemen or soldiers, to prevent hostile hegemonies, barbarous conduct, proliferation of dangerous weapons and drugs, or as a tool to assist in the development of a safer and freer world, is ultimately a question not for the Administration, but for the American people. Thus, the primary intellectual skill will not be simply what to think, but how to think. Each strategic dilemma will need to be considered in its full environment, even by specialists whose normal context is in a single discipline. Changes to this process are evident. Already, complexities of foreign policy and Federal Law have many specialists simultaneously thinking as environmentalists, economists, human rights advocates, jurists and press officers. We need to deliberately shape this process.

Finally, our nation requires both warrior-diplomats and diplomat-warriors. The inherent difference between them is only useful if we understand this dynamic relationship and potentially harmful if we do not. The required culture of training, education and planning will take years to develop. However, it is well worth the cost. The benefits directly relate to our national interest and to the peace and stability of the world.

Word Count: 15,093

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Daniel R. Russell, <u>America's Place in the World</u> (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2000), p. 32.
 - ² IBID, p. 22.
 - ³ IBID, p. 29.
 - ⁴ Richard Holbrooke, <u>To End a War</u> (New York: Random House, 1998) p. 216.
 - ⁵ Russell, IBID.
- ⁶ Jonathan Clarke, "The Conceptual Poverty of U.S. Foreign Policy," in <u>The Atlantic Monthly</u>, September 1993; Volume 272, No. 3, pages 54-56.
 - ⁷ Donald F. Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1973), p. 23.
- ⁸ Robert Murphy, <u>Diplomat Among Warriors</u> (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Company, 1964), p. 156.
- ⁹ Dean Acheson, <u>Present at the Creation, My Years in the State Department</u> (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969) and Army Oral History Program interview with General Mark Clark by Lieutenant Colonel Forest S. Rittgers, Jr., at Charleston, South Carolina, January 17, 1973.
 - 10 Bletz, IBID, pp. 94-95.
 - ¹¹ Acheson and Clark, IBID.
- ¹² George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, 1982 to 1989, interviewed by the anonymous authors of "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus," at Stanford University, April 13, 1998.
- Discussion with Colonel Dennis Murphy, U.S. Army George Marshall Fellow at the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, Washington, D.C. "In many ways the real interagency breakthrough in the 1990s was not caused by a military operation, but by the success of the interagency support to the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta."
 - 14 Russell, IBID, p.3.
- Tara Sonenshine, Senior Advisor, U.S. Institute of Peace and Board Member, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Moderator of the Round Table Discussion, "To See Ourselves as Others See Us: How the U.S. is Viewed from Abroad," with participants Thomas Gorguissian, Correspondent, (Cairo) Al Wafd; Patrick Sabatier, U.S. Bureau Chief, (Paris) Libération. Jose Carreno, Correspondent, El Universal; Arkady Orlov, Correspondent, RIA-Novosti-Russia News Agency; and Tina Chung, Bureau Chief, China Television System, at the Edmund Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, November 11, 1999.
- ¹⁶ Newt Gingrich, "Diplomacy in the Information Age," The Eighteenth Oscar Iden Lecture, hosted by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, October 7, 1997. See also Barry Fulton, "Learning From Business," <u>Foreign Service Journal</u> (December 1997): 28-33.
 - 17 Russell, IBID, p. 23.

- ¹⁸ Stanley Sloan, Mary Locke and Casimir A. Yost, <u>The Foreign Policy Struggle: Congress and the President in the 1990's and Beyond</u> (Washington, D.C.: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 2000), p 1.
 - ¹⁹ Sloan, Locke and Yost, IBID.
 - ²⁰ Clarke, IBID.
 - ²¹ Litt, IBID, p. 10.
 - ²² IBID.
- ²³ General Henry Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a speech at Harvard University, January 17, 2000, as released by the Office of Public Relations, Department of Defense.
- ²⁴ Samuel (Sandy) Berger interview on Public Television program "News Hour" by Jim Lehrer, February 23, 1999.
- ²⁵ Laurence I. Radway, <u>Foreign Policy and National Defense</u> (Atlanta: Scott, Foreman and Company, 1969) p.75.
 - ²⁶ Colonel (Retired) William Clontz e-mail to Colonel Thomas H. Tutt, March 9, 2000.
- ²⁷ Harry G. Summers, Jr., <u>On Strategy: a critical analysis of the Vietnam War</u> (Novato, CA: Presido Press, 1982) p. 34.
- ²⁸ Casimir Yost, "Directionless Foreign Policy: It's too late for Clinton to shape world events now," Washington Post.
- ²⁹ Colin S. Gray, <u>The Second Nuclear Age</u> (London and Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999) p.
- ³⁰ One of the major military strategy debates of the 1950s was whether conventional armies could still prevail in battle. Many advocates of nuclear warfighting, especially in the USAF, saw the days of soldiers on the ground as history. The US Army struggled to assert a role for itself and compromised many maneuver and organizational rules learned in World War Two when it created the "Pentomic" division by greatly reducing the size and lethality of its conventional forces by supplementing lost firepower with tactical nuclear weapons.
- ³¹ David Litt, Political Advisor, US Special Operations Command, "Preparing for the Crisis After Next: Strategic Future Visioning at the Department of State" working paper, February 2000, p. 5.
 - ³² Ambassador (Retired) George F. Jones, interview by Colonel Thomas H. Tutt, January 2000.
- ³³ Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright, "Opening Statement before the Senate Budget Committee," Washington, D.C., February 11, 2000, as released by the Office of the Spokesman, U.S. Department of State.
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- ³⁵ Discussion and e-mail correspondence between Colonel Norm St. Pierre, U.S. Department of State, and Colonel Thomas H. Tutt, February and March, 2000.
- ³⁶ Discussion between Mr. Edward S. Pusey, Principal Director, Russia, Ukraine and Eurasia, Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, and Colonel Thomas H. Tutt, March, 2000.
- ³⁷ Conclusion reached from discussions in January and February 2000, with Ambassador George F. Jones, Ambassador Robert Oakley and Army Attaché Stefan Aubrey, ARMA at US Embassy Stockholm.
 - ³⁸ Discussion with Colonel Norm St. Pierre, IBID.
- ³⁹ Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, "Defense Diplomacy" paper for International Institute for Strategic Studies 41st Annual Conference, September 1999.
 - ⁴⁰ St. Pierre, IBID.
 - ⁴¹ Litt, IBID, p. 4.
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- ⁴³ Here specifically should be mentioned the close and productive relationship between the CinC, General Gary Luck, the US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, Jim Laney, and the US Special Envoy, Bob Gallucci.
- ⁴⁴ Ralph A. Hallenbeck, <u>Military Force as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: Intervention in Lebanon, August 1982-February 1984</u> (New York: Praeger, 1991) chapters 3 and 4.
- ⁴⁵ Robert B. Oakley, "Developing a Strategy for Troubled States" in <u>Joint Forces Quarterly</u>, Summer 1996 (Washington: National Institute for Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996).
- ⁴⁶ Anonymous authors, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus," Stanford University, unpublished paper, 1998. This informative paper has been circulating in Defense and State Department circles for several years and is now briefed to Army Attachés in training by the Political Advisor to the Chief of Staff of the Army.
 - ⁴⁷ Anonymous, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus", p. 12.
 - ⁴⁸ IBID, p. 8.
 - ⁴⁹ IBID, p. 10.
 - ⁵⁰ Russell, IBID, p. 46.
 - ⁵¹ Anonymous, "Defense is from Mars, State is from Venus", p. 12.
 - 52 IBID.
 - ⁵³ Acheson, IBID, p. 478.
 - ⁵⁴ Acheson, IBID, p. 216.

- ⁵⁵ Litt, IBID, p. 5.
- ⁵⁶ Colin L. Powell, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995) p. 576.
- ⁵⁷ Advice from General Gary Luck, former CinCROKUS, during an interview, February 2000.
- ⁵⁸ Gray, IBID, p. 33.
- ⁵⁹ These officials requested non-attribution of their remarks. Discussions were held between them and the author both at Georgetown University and at the State Department in 1999.
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- ⁶² This conclusion came from discussion with three experts on Pakistan: former Ambassador Robert Oakley, former Army Attaché Colonel Terry Cook, and a former Defense Representative to Pakistan who wishes to remain anonymous.
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 - ⁶⁴ Bletz, IBID, p. 29.
- ⁶⁵ William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, <u>The Undeclared War, 1940-1941</u> (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), pp. 739-740.
 - ⁶⁶ Bletz, IBID, p. 55.
- ⁶⁷ Maxwell D. Taylor, "Military Advice Its Use in Government," <u>Vital Speeches</u>, March 15, 1964, quoted in Bletz, IBID, p. 60.
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